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Abstract: Increasing tax revenues by curtailing the shadow economy has been a 
central goal of tax policy and administration in the Republic of Korea since the 
National Tax Service was established as an independent agency in 1966. This 
paper examines the Tax Incentives for Electronically Traceable Payments (TIETP) 
introduced by the Korean tax authorities in 1999 to promote payments made using 
credit cards, debit cards, and electronic cash receipts in business-to-consumer 
transactions. TIETP allows wage and salary earners to claim tax deductions 
for eligible purchases made using electronically traceable payments when they 
file their year-end income tax return. This tax incentive scheme has greatly 
contributed to transforming the Korean economy into a cashless economy over 
the last decade and a half. Card payments as a ratio of Korea’s GDP have ranked 
highest in the world since 2005, reaching 49% in 2014. TIETP has increased the 
percentage of business income earners who pay taxes from stagnant at around 
30% up to the late 1990s to approximately 80% at present. The effective personal 
income tax rate for business income followed a continuous upward trend from 
3.4% in 1998 to 6.3% in 2013. The total revenue increase driven by TIETP has 
been estimated as ₩3.4 trillion, with TIETP costs reaching ₩1.9 trillion. The net 
gain is an estimated ₩1.4 trillion (approximately US$1.3 billion), an increase 
of personal income tax revenue by 4.2%. TIETP also had a positive impact on 
income redistribution, decreasing Gini coefficients by 0.11 percentage points. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to evaluate the performance of the Tax Incentives for Electroni-
cally Traceable Payments (TIETP) in Korea, particularly in terms of the effects on 
tax revenue and income redistribution. It is widely believed that it has been success-
ful in promoting tax compliance. However, this belief is based only on subjective 
inference and is not supported by any concrete evidence.
Tax administrations around the world are losing valuable tax revenues due to non-
compliance by members of the shadow economy. According to some estimates, on 
average, one-third of the world economy is informally structured (see, for example, 
Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro 2010). Many consumers are all too familiar with 
the seductive temptation of buying goods without a bill or a receipt and saving on the 
value-added tax (or sales tax) that would otherwise be paid. It may not even cross the 
mind of a consumer who uses the services of a plumber or a carpenter and forks over 
the fees in cash that a VAT on the service rendered should have been added to the 
billed amount.
Cash has always been a facilitator of the shadow economy, since cash transactions 
do not leave an audit trail. Cash transactions between businesses and individual con-
sumers are susceptible to falling prey to the shadow economy. Individuals are con-
sumers of business goods and services, and if they purchase these goods and services 
in cash, they provide businesses with the opportunity not to report or to underreport 
those sales. However, consumers do not always have a reason to ask for invoices or 
receipts from businesses, since they ordinarily do not seek a tax credit for VAT or 
report it as an expense on their income tax return. Hence if business sellers offer cus-
tomers prices lower than their competitors’ on the condition of cash payment, cus-
tomers are very likely to accept that offer. Authorities find it hard to detect and curb 
cash transactions of this sort, since sellers and buyers have no conflicting interests 
and provide no cross-checks.
In this context, measures to encourage businesses and consumers to pay their bills 
using banking channels or electronic forms of payment can and should be designed 
and implemented as a means of creating audit trails. There appears to be a strong 
negative relationship between use of electronic or formal payments and the size of 
the shadow economy. A study of the European economy by A. T. Kearney and 
Schneider confirms this association (2009).
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Figure 1. The Shadow Economy and Electronic Transactions
Many countries, therefore, are making concerted efforts to encourage the report-
ing of sales transactions and the use of formal payment systems and to discourage 
cash transactions. Adoption of tax measures—both in the realm of policy and admin-
istration—are required to incentivize formal payments for business transactions 
through banking channels, including electronic payments and the use of “plastic 
money.” Tax policy and tax administration can be important components of a broader 
strategy to increase the level of cashless transactions; the tax system can either pro-
vide a stimulus for moving to noncash payment methods or it can discourage the use 
of cash. Of course, encouraging cashless transactions and promoting the use of bank-
ing channels is a holistic effort requiring the participation of several government 
agencies (from tax authorities to ministries of finance, from central banks to financial 
intelligence units).
To move successfully in the direction of a cashless economy requires the strong 
political will to adopt the necessary measures. Among the measures adopted by some 
countries to reduce the shadow economy are incentives for payments by electronic 
means, limitations on cash payments, limits on cash withdrawals from bank accounts 
for legal entities and individual businesspeople, partial exemptions from taxation 
turnover for businesses conducted in noncash form, restrictions on buying and selling 
operations for a single transaction or for a certain time period, mandatory use of 
point-of-sale terminals in the trade and service sectors, expansion in other economic 
sectors of obligatory use of cash registers with SIM cards, and so on. Arguments con-
tinue over the effectiveness of these various measures, but recent research supports 
the conclusion that these efforts, if backed by public outreach campaigns communi-
cating the benefits of cashless transactions, can help promote the use of banking 
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Several countries around the globe have adopted specific tax measures to encour-
age reporting of business-to-consumer transactions and to promote cashless transac-
tions and banking channels (Awasthi & Engelschalk, forthcoming). For example, in 
Colombia, a 2% VAT refund is available for individuals on purchases made by debit 
and credit card or electronic banking for products and services paid at the general 
16% rate or at the 5% rate. Argentina launched a VAT discount for debit card use at 
point of sale in 2001, giving cardholders a 5% reduction in the basic VAT rate of 21% 
on all purchases under ARS$1,000 (US$220). In 2003, Argentina added credit cards 
to the policy, giving cardholders a 3% reduction on their purchases. The government 
also introduced a further 2% reduction on purchases of gasoline via debit or credit 
payments. Credit card rebates were abolished in 2009, but debit card rebates remain 
in force.
Countries in the European Union have established quantitative limits (the highest 
limit is €12,700 in the Czech Republic and the lowest is €1,300 in Denmark) on the 
amount of cash that can be used to purchase goods and services in one twenty-four 
hour period. The idea is that individuals will thus be forced to use electronic means of 
payments—such as credit, debit, and ATM cards—which necessarily go through the 
banking system and hence are far easier to track. Several other countries also have 
policies directly prohibiting the use of cash for business transactions over a certain 
limit. In Peru, payments exceeding S/.3,500 (US$1,000) must be made via bank 
account deposits, wire transfers, payment orders, credit cards, nonnegotiable checks, 
or other means of payment as provided by entities of the Peruvian financial system. 
In Turkey, payments of amounts over TL8,000 and any rental payments over TL500 
must be made through the banking system or postal office. The effectiveness of these 
limits at curbing cash transactions is not clear, however, and confirmation is lacking 
that transactions are not being split to avoid the limits on cash use.
Countries often mandate limits on the use of cash for expenses that qualify as 
business deductions. In Colombia, as of January 1, 2014, any expenses considered 
deductible for tax purposes have to be made through one of the following payment 
methods: deposits in bank accounts, bank transfers, checks, and credit or debit cards.1 
Cash payments are fiscally deductible only if they are below a certain amount. In 
Mexico, allowable deductions of a company’s expenditures must be backed by a digi-
tal tax receipt issued, and payments exceeding MXN$2,000 must be made through 
electronic transfer of funds, by personal check or credit, debit, or service cards, or 
through an electronic pocketbook. In India, sections 40A (3) and (3A) of the Income 
 1. “Medios de pago para efectos de la aceptación de costos, deducciones, pasivos e impuestos 
descontables,” added to Law 1430 of 2010. 
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Tax Act provide that any expense over    20,000 in one day will not be deductible if 
the payment is not made through bank instruments.
Several countries have mandated use of point-of-sales devices. In Kazakhstan, 
individual businesses of certain types are obliged to accept payment cards and, 
accordingly, must install point-of-sale terminals. In Turkey, self-employed doctors, 
dentists, and veterinarians must use point-of-sale devices in their offices. Another 
measure is to mandate enterprises employing more than ten employees to pay their 
salaries, including bonuses, through banks. This rule also affects payroll taxes, requir-
ing that they be paid on behalf of employees, and personal income taxes, which are 
deducted from salaries as they are paid through banking channels, creating a clear 
audit trail. Other countries with cash payment caps—including France, Turkey, 
Greece, Italy, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands—legally require merchants to 
issue receipts for each transaction and have allowed merchants to refuse payment in 
cash to compel the use of cards at the point of sale. If followed, these measures 
would facilitate fiscal control, but it is not clear whether they are followed.
A number of countries have introduced special reporting or withholding require-
ments for cash payments to businesses. In Mexico, financial-sector institutions must 
report cash deposits made to taxpayers’ accounts when the accumulated monthly 
amount of cash deposits exceeds MXN$15,000. In 2009, the Mexican Central Bank 
set a MXN$20,000 ceiling for checks payable to the bearer in order to combat fraud. 
The 2014 tax reform package also allows Mexican tax officials to screen credit card 
data. Using cash or precious metals for certain transactions over amounts specified in 
the law is prohibited. An example of a general major cash payment reporting system 
is the Form 8300 system in the United States. Any person engaged in a trade or busi-
ness who receives more than US$10,000 in one transaction or several related transac-
tions must file a cash payment report to the Internal Revenue Service. The system, 
developed jointly by the Internal Revenue Service and the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network, is used by the government to track tax evaders and individuals profit-
ing from criminal activities.
Considering the difficulties of ensuring the correct reporting of cash income, tax 
administrations are simultaneously aiming at tracing the deposit and use of cash reve-
nues. Cash income will eventually be deposited in a private bank account, spent, or 
transferred abroad. Matching data on the wealth and spending behavior of a shadow 
economy business operator with data in his income tax return can reveal major dis-
crepancies and hidden sources of income. Developing 360-degree profiles of high 
net-worth individuals is useful for tracking this hidden income and wealth.
Increasing tax revenues by broadening the tax base and further reducing the shad-
ow economy has been at the center of tax policy and administration in the Republic 
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of Korea since the National Tax Service was established as an independent agency in 
1966. The tax incentives promoting use of electronically traceable payments made 
through credit cards, debit cards, and electronic cash receipts that the Korean govern-
ment introduced in 1999 were a pioneering way to broaden the tax base in busi-
ness-to-consumer transactions. It is now believed that these measures contributed to 
broadening the tax base to a great extent by curbing cash transactions. This paper 
analyzes how Korea successfully curtailed the shadow economy using these methods.
The second section defines the term “shadow economy” as it is used throughout 
the paper and describes policy measures adopted in many developed countries partic-
ularly in the European Union. The third section outlines the history of tax-related pol-
icy measures in Korea and its attempts to cope with income underreporting, particu-
larly through the TIETP. The fourth section provides statistical and empirical infor-
mation regarding the performance of TIETP. In particular, its effects on the tax reve-
nue and income redistribution are thoroughly discussed. The last section briefly 
discusses policy implications.
THE SHADOW ECONOMY 
AND POLICY MEASURES ADOPTED TO COMBAT IT
What Is the Shadow Economy?
Although the term “shadow economy” has been variously defined in relation to 
specific research objectives and data, one widely accepted definition is “concealed pro-
duction and the underground economy,” adopted by the System of National Accounts 
in 1993 and subsequently readopted in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development handbook, Measuring the Non-Observed Economy (2002), as fol-
lows: 
Certain activities may be both productive in an economic sense and also quite legal 
(provided certain standards or regulations are complied with) but deliberately con-
cealed from public authorities for the following kinds of reasons:
(a) To avoid the payment of income, value added or other taxes;
(b) To avoid the payment of social security contributions;
    (c) To avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maxi-
mum hours, safety or health standards, etc.;
    (d) To avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
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statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.
      (Commission of the European Communities et al. 1993, p.153)
This paper focuses on the shadow economy comprising productive legal activi-
ties concealed from tax authorities to avoid the payment of income, value-added, or 
other taxes, that is, category (a) of the definition. However, category (a) sometimes, 
or even usually, overlaps with (b), (c), or (d); therefore, any tax policy measures 
intended to curtail the kinds of payments that make up category (a) may have effects 
on the kinds of payments that make up the other subcategories of the shadow econo-
my as a positive by-product. Unregistered microfirms, for example, operate com-
pletely outside the formal economy and attempt to avoid meeting minimum wage 
standards or paying social security contributions, as well as income tax, and val-
ue-added tax as a matter of course. Therefore, any tax measures aimed at bringing 
such unregistered firms into the formal economy and getting them to pay taxes will 
simultaneously reduce instances of the type of noncompliance described in subcate-
gories (b), (c), or (d). Tax compliance measures aimed at registered firms that partly 
underreport their sales to avoid income- or value-added tax would also have a limit-
ed effect on the kinds of payments the comprise the other categories in the shadow 
economy.
What Are the Key Characteristics of the Shadow Economy?
Many countries, whether developed or developing, have shadow economies. The 
causes of shadow economies are manifold. According to Feld and Schneider’s sum-
mary of thirty-two studies on the shadow economy and its causes, “increase of the 
tax and social security contribution burdens” was by far the most important single 
contributor to the growth of the shadow economy, followed by “tax morale,” “quality 
of state institutions,” and “specific labor market regulations” (2010). However, con-
trary to traditional thinking that the tax burden is a significant driver of the shadow 
economy, some scholars have presented opposing empirical research results showing 
that the tax burden has a negative correlation with the shadow economy (Friedman, 
Johnson, & Kaufmann 2000; Stankevičius & Vasiliauskaite 2014). Cumbersome 
labor-market restrictions, loss of access to the formal financial sector, and weak gov-
ernance and institutions also determine the size of the shadow economy (Singh, 
Jain-Chandra, & Mohommad 2012). Even if the tax burden is not a key driver of the 
shadow economy, noncompliance with tax laws remains one of its manifestations. 
Any measures to bring people into compliance with tax laws would curtail the shad-
ow economy and at the same time contribute to addressing causes of the shadow 
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economy other than taxation.
The shadow economy defined from the perspective of taxation comprises two 
types of activities: (i) activities of unregistered informal enterprises (including indi-
viduals) operating completely outside the formal economy (undeclared work), and 
(ii) activities of registered companies in the formal sector intentionally underreport-
ing their sales (underreporting). Informal firms that do not register and that operate 
outside the formal economy evade paying taxes and do not comply with other man-
datory legal requirements, such as paying employees the minimum wage or social 
security contributions. Registered formal firms can also underreport their income to 
evade payment of taxes, especially in cash-intensive businesses. In some cases, for-
mal firms can also avoid compliance with legal requirements through undeclared 
work by unregistered workers. Meanwhile, people who want work but who are not 
competitive in the labor market, such as the elderly, women, ethnic minorities, ille-
gal immigrants, and recipients of government transfers, are also voluntarily or invol-
untarily hired informally. Shadow economy firm owners tend to hire those people at 
very low wages, do not pay their share of social security contributions, and do not 
abide by other legal obligations in relation to hiring. Firms can evade income tax, 
VAT, and social security contributions completely or partially, while informal 
employees in those firms are not subject to income tax, their share of social security 
contributions, and reduction in (or termination of) government transfers. Individuals 
who buy goods and services from the firms operating in the shadow economy can 
benefit from lower prices that tax evasion makes possible. All participants in the 
shadow economy have shared interests and benefit from it, and so in most cases, 
they enter into secret collusive relationships that are difficult for public authorities to 
identify.
The collusive and secretive nature of these relationships leads parties to informal 
transactions to avoid using record-traceable transaction means, such as bank transfer, 
credit card, or check- or debit card payments. They prefer cash transactions that do 
not leave footprints traceable by tax authorities. Informal firms pay out or receive 
cash only for business purposes, and they also pay cash salaries to their informal 
employees. Formal companies seeking to evade taxes also prefer cash transactions 
and pay their informal employees in cash. Figure 2 illustrates the two types of shad-
ow economy: undeclared work and underreporting.
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Figure 2. Two Types of Shadow Economy and Their Structures
What Policy Measures Can Reduce the Shadow Economy?
Measures to reduce the shadow economy that do not tackle its core aspects or that 
focus on piecemeal reforms may be ineffective. For example, lowering the barriers to 
business registration, by, for example, simplifying the registration process, scrapping 
unnecessary registration documentation, and lowering legal requirements for registra-
tion, may facilitate formalization and yet fail to make significant headway toward 
curbing the shadow economy in the absence of other comprehensive measures to turn 
informality into formality. Although liberalization with respect to registration per se 
is a good policy for the business environment, it may not be enough to undermine the 
shadow economy, since informal firms have various reasons for remaining informal, 
including avoiding paying taxes, making onerous social security contributions, and 
meeting other labor condition standards, it would be difficult to convert informality 
to formality merely by deregulating registration. Mexico provides an example. Mexi-
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co reformed and simplified its local business registration process, which led to an 
uptick in the number of new business registrations, but the reforms do not seem to 
have induced unregistered businesses to register (Rruhn 2008). In the face of this, 
Perry et al. (2007) and Choi et al. (2013) suggest a wider, more integrated approach to 
inducing formality, one that would combine carrot and stick policies. Policy measures 
that directly address a key aspect of the shadow economy—collusive cash transac-
tions—are necessary to induce informal firms to enter the formal economy. If using 
cash for payment is made difficult for participants in the shadow economy, the shadow 
economy will shrink. Recent support for this approach has been supplied by K. S. 
Rogoff (2016), who envisions a bold currency policy that phases out cash altogether to 
eliminate tax evasion and reduce crime. Also very worth keeping an eye on are the 
longer-term effects of India’s abrupt revocation in 2016 of two of its highest-denomi-
nation notes (the    500- and 1,000- notes), seemingly undertaken to achieve goals sim-
ilar to those advocated by Rogoff. This section explores various tax policies or admin-
istrative measures used by a number of countries to induce businesses to switch from 
informality to formality.
Policy Measures Adopted to Deter Undeclared Work
The EU countries regard undeclared work as more problematic than underreport-
ed goods or services (Jensen & Wőhlbier 2012, p.27). Undeclared work accounts for 
roughly two-thirds of the shadow economy—the other one-third comes from under-
reporting—and half of the roughly 200 measures that have been adopted in European 
countries to combat the shadow economy focus on undeclared work (A. T. Kearney, 
VISA, & Schneider 2013). Deterrent measures, such as identifying, criminalizing, 
and penalizing undeclared work, were prevalent in EU countries, but recently they 
have begun to adopt incentives designed to induce voluntary compliance instead 
(Williams 2009). According to a survey of policy measures adopted in the EU coun-
tries, almost all countries impose administrative or penal sanctions on either purchas-
ers or suppliers of goods and services involved in undeclared work (Dekker et al. 
2010). However, despite the fact that buyers benefit from tax evasion, fewer coun-
tries impose penalties on purchasers (Jensen & Wőhlbier 2012, p.28).
In Italy, for example, under the Decreto Bersani, a law passed in 2006, a retailer 
that fails to issue a sales receipt three times in a five-year period can be forced to 
close, and construction sites can be shut down if employment irregularities are found. 
It is also illegal to use cash to pay more than €100 for professional services (A. T. 
Kearney, VISA, & Schneider 2009). Buyers of undeclared work must keep receipts 
to present if asked to tax authorities to avoid sanctions. Norway requires purchasers 
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to pay using electronic means or to keep invoices for a specified time to avoid crimi-
nal liability for purchases of undeclared services (Jensen & Wőhlbier 2012, p.28). 
Penalizing both providers and buyers of undeclared work can be more effective in 
sabotaging the collusive relationship between them. However, the process of moni-
toring a large number of small and micro businesses to determine whether they are 
issuing receipts—and then ensuring that the general public keeps those receipts—is 
almost impossible, given the tax authorities’ limited resources. Those measures have 
potential deterrent effects, but they may not be implementable in practice. Many 
scholars have therefore questioned the effectiveness of deterrent measures, in general, 
including detecting and punishing (Williams & Schneider 2016, pp.147–148).
Another noticeable deterrent measure for reducing overall cash transactions that 
can lead to tax evasion and fraud has been rolled out by Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, and the Slovak 
Republic, which have introduced cash payment limits, mostly since the crisis of 
2012, as shown in table 1.
Table 1. Cash Payment Restrictions in the European Union
Belgium €3,000 January 1, 2014
Bulgaria        10,000(= €5,112) July 1, 2011
Czech Republic Kč350,000 (= €12,763) January 1, 2013
Denmark kr10,000 (= €1,340)
France €3,000 (resident and nonresident sellers)€15,000 (nonresident consumers) July 1, 2012
Greece €1,500 January 1, 2002
Hungary Ft1.5 million (= €5,000) (legal persons) January 1, 2013
Italy €999.99 December 6, 2012
Portugal €1,000 May 14, 2012
Slovak Republic €5,000€15,000 (natural persons who are not entrepreneurs) January 1, 2013
Spain €2,500 (residents) November 19, 2012
Source: Beretta 2014.
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Such limits force people to make electronic payments, leaving a trail tax authorities 
can trace. However, legislation enabling tax authorities to access this information must 
be passed, which has not happened in all EU member countries (Jensen & Wőhlbier 
2012). In addition, the European Central Bank warns that although such limitations on 
cash payments comply with EU law, they should be carefully weighed so that a bal-
ance is achieved between the policy’s objectives and its possible negative effects, 
namely, overly restricting individuals’ freedom of economic activity (European Cen-
tral Bank 2014a, 2014b).2  Another question regarding this approach is how cash limits 
can be enforced, given that cash transactions are typically collusive. If buyers and sell-
ers agree to pay and receive cash without leaving a financial footprint, the relevant 
authorities’ ability to detect those transactions and enforce cash limits remains ques-
tionable.
Incentive Measures to Curtail Undeclared Work
Measures to induce voluntary compliance by providing monetary or nonmonetary 
incentives have been introduced in several EU countries. One prominent incentive 
scheme addresses household services, which tend to remain undeclared work in the 
European Union. In recent years, tax deductions or direct subsidies for purchasers of 
household services have been introduced to support their expense for cleaning, cook-
ing, laundry, home maintenance, and care for children, the elderly, and the disabled. 
The overall goals are to induce undeclared work to enter the formal economy and to 
create jobs in several EU countries, although the scope of eligible services, the form 
of support, the amount of tax deduction or subsidy, and the specific conditions that 
have to be met to take advantage of the incentives differ between countries. Public 
interventions in different countries to narrow the expense gap between formal and 
informal service provision range from direct subsidies to household service providers 
or users to public revenue expenditure through tax deductions, tax exemptions, or 
VAT-reduced rates. Table 2 provides a summary of representative EU countries’ tax 
incentives, excerpted from the European Commission report, Developing Personal 
and Household Services (2013).
 2. “In any case, limitations on cash payments should be proportionate to the objectives pur-
sued and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve such objectives…Any nega-
tive impact of the proposed limitations should be carefully weighed against the public ben-
efits expected to be derived from them” (European Central Bank 2014a, 2014b).
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Table 2. Tax Incentives for Household Services
Belgium
Tax reductions are linked to the use of vouchers used to purchase household 
services. Vouchers, available from Agences locales d’emploi and Titre services 
are eligible for tax deduction, the former 30% and the latter 30% to 40%. The 
ceiling for voucher tax deductions is €2,400 (the total of both vouchers).
Denmark
In 1994, Denmark became the first country to introduce a subsidy of 50% of 
cost to support household services, such as garden work, snow clearance, 
shopping for daily goods, cooking, cleaning, laundry, and window cleaning.
The benefit was reduced in 2004, and benefits were limited to people aged 65 
or older. 
In 2011, a tax credit was allowed to all private persons; however, it was 
abolished in 2013.
Finland
A tax deduction was introduced in 1997 for household services carried out in 
the taxpayer’s or an elderly relative’s home. Under this program, if the tax 
deduction is larger than the amount of the central government income tax, the 
taxpayer’s local government taxes can also be reduced. 
Since 2009, eligible services include household work, caregiving, and day-
care services at home; repair work; services for a leisure house; and IT 
services.
The tax deduction is 40% of expenses paid to a company, small entrepreneur, 
or a nonprofit organization (60% until 2011) and 15% of wages paid for hiring 
an employee.
The person employing an individual is except from the social contribution 
requirement.
France
France allows 50% of expenses for cleaning, ironing, IT assistance, and 
private lessons as income tax deductions.
Tax deductions are given to households that either directly employ an 
individual service supplier at home or that hire a service company.
The tax deduction ceiling is €12,000 per year, but it can be increased 
depending on the number of children, residents aged 64 or older, and 
disabled residents. 
Beginning in 2007, if the eligible tax deduction surpasses the income tax, the 
difference between them is reimbursed to help low- income households.
Germany
A tax credit is allowed for up to 20% of the costs for household-related 
services, such as gardening, cleaning, laundry services, and childcare.
In addition, 20% of the wage costs for craft services, such as repairs and 
renovations, can be offset with income tax.
Italy
Tax incentives are linked to purchases of vouchers, but the scope of covered 
work is very broad. It includes maintenance of buildings, seasonal and 
agricultural activities, organization of sporting events, and so on.
Luxembourg
Tax reduction for the expense of housework services and care services for 
dependent persons or children is allowed, but the maximum tax rebate is 
€3,600 per year and €300 per month.
Sweden
Sweden’s tax deduction for household services has two components: RUT 
(cleaning, maintenance, servicing) and ROT (home renovation services).
Tax credits are allowed up to 50% of labor costs (including VAT) for 
household services. The sum of the tax credits for RUT and ROT must not 
exceed around €5,500 per person per year.
Source: Authors’ summary from European Commission (2013).
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Assessments regarding monetary support for household services are mixed. In 
1998, the European Commission issued a positive evaluation of such policies, stating, 
“Tax-deductions and subsidies for re-furbishing and improvements of houses have 
been particularly successful in encouraging more people to use the opportunity to 
repair their houses legally, and had the effect of moving work which might have been 
done informally to the formal registered sector” (European Commission 1998). A 
paper published by European Commission fifteen years later (Jensen & Wőhlbier 
2012), however, notes that “although such tax credits and subsidies may have a posi-
tive impact on employment in the formal economy, they tend to be expensive in 
terms of foregone revenue, and the experienced results in terms of reduction of the 
shadow economy have not been convincing, in particular when compared to the cost 
of the measure. Moreover, these measures tend to introduce a ‘trap’ which might lock 
in this kind of household jobs.” The most recent European Commission report 
acknowledges that these policies “proved to be quite costly,” but it also offers analy-
sis not only of gross public expense but also direct and indirect earn-back effects; for 
example, the data show a 45% reduction in net cost for public expense in Belgium 
and positive returns in Finland and France (European Commission 2013).
Normative Policy Measures
A softer approach to curbing the shadow economy that cultivates tax morale, 
enhances tax-system fairness, and encourages social norms for tax compliance is 
now being considered in EU states as a complement to traditional economic incen-
tives and disincentives. This approach is widely discussed in the literature, and ana-
lysts generally consider it to be effective. However, the EU countries still depend 
heavily on traditional stick and carrot policies, and very few have adopted normative 
compliance measures, such as appeals to citizens to declare their activities, cam-
paigns to encourage a culture of commitment to declaration, and efforts to change 
perceptions of the tax system’s fairness (Williams & Schneider 2016, pp.153–154). 
Policy Measures against Underreporting
A number of OECD countries have attempted to tackle not only undeclared work 
but also underreporting in business-to-consumer retail sectors prone to falling into 
the shadow economy due to their heavy volume of cash transactions.3 All around the 
 3. The Canadian Restaurant and Food Services Association estimated suppressed sales of 
CAN$2.4 billion for 2009 in the restaurant sector; Sweden recovered €150 million in 2,000 
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world, electronic cash registers and electronic point-of-sale systems are manipulated 
via electronic sales suppression software known as phantomware and zappers to 
enable underreporting of sales(OECD 2013). To counter this kind of fraud, the Irish 
government, as of July 2008, made it mandatory that electronic cash registers record 
and retain sales entries in electronic format with uniquely identifiable sequential 
numbers, dates, and times, and it issued guidelines on requirements for proper 
record keeping (e.g., securing the integrity of data) for cash registers (Iris Revenue 
2015). Many countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Venezuela, and Canada Quebec, have 
made the use of certified electronic cash registers or point-of-sale systems in target-
ed business sectors (e.g., restaurants) mandatory. Adding monitoring devices to the 
point-of-sale system, securing data with digital signatures, or transferring transac-
tion data to tax authorities (OECD 2013) are methods that can prevent cash receipt 
skimming. This approach may not ultimately eradicate underreporting fraud in cases 
in which business sellers and customers agree to off-the-record cash transactions or 
when business sellers simply do not register cash transactions without receipts. 
Other problems with the certified cash register approach are the potential for too 
much interference by governments in private businesses and the high cost of the reg-
isters, which will restrict mandatory adoption to certain business sectors (Ainsworth 
& Hengartner 2009).
Another approach to countering underreporting fraud is to provide incentives for 
customers to request receipts from businesses. Taiwan, China, introduced the 
“receipt lottery” in 1951 to encourage people to secure receipts when purchasing 
goods or services from businesses, which in turn prompted businesses to file their 
sales correctly according to their receipts issued. Mainland China likewise intro-
duced mandatory lottery receipts in all tax bureaus in 2009 after experimenting with 
the concept in more than 80 big-city-level tax bureaus, including Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Tianjin (Wan 2010). According to Wan’s analysis, lottery receipts increased 
sales tax and total tax revenues significantly in the experiment areas (2010). Puerto 
Rico also introduced a sales-and-use tax receipt lottery in 2011 but then eliminated it 
in 2015.4 Sao Paulo, Brazil, in contrast, introduced VAT rebates for receipts. End 
consumers collecting receipts are able to receive tax rebates of 20% of the VAT paid 
by the final sales establishment. In addition, lottery tickets are given for every 
audits over four years; and Norway found a single case involving underreporting of €7 mil-
lion (OECD 2013).
 4. Anna Karuvilla, “Puerto Rico Eliminates the Sales Tax Lottery,” Reuters, November 3, 
2015, https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/onesource/vat-gst-management/puerto-ri-
co-eliminates-sales-tax-lottery.
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US$50 purchase. This Nota Fiscal Paulista program has increased firms’ reported 
revenues by at least 22% (Naritomi 2015).
Table 3 offers a summary of policy measures for reducing informal firms’ or 
individuals’ undeclared work and formal firms’ underreporting. Policy measures can 
be categorized according to targets, which include sellers and buyers. A further clas-
sification is by policy approaches: deterrent, incentivizing, and normative. The poli-
cy measures mapped in this matrix reduce undeclared work, underreporting, or both. 
Normative approaches can be divided into “seller” and “buyer” categories but they 
are presented here without distinction. 





monitoring and auditing (undeclared 
work and underreporting)
penalties for not invoicing (undeclared 
work and underreporting)
mandatory use of electronic cash 
register or point of sale 
(underreporting)
criminalization (undeclared work)
penalties for not getting receipts 
(undeclared work and underreporting)




deregulating registration process, 
lowering expenses for formalization 
(low taxes, low burdens for 
employment, and other deregulations) 
(undeclared work)
tax incentives for e-payments 
(undeclared work and underreporting)
tax incentives or direct subsidy for 
home services (undeclared work)
tax incentives to make electronically 
traceable payments (underreporting) 





tax education and public awareness (undeclared work and underreporting)
enhancing tax morale and cultivating a compliance culture (undeclared work 
and underreporting)
building trust regarding tax policy and administration (undeclared work and 
underreporting)
Can Tax Incentives for Electronic Payments Curtail the Shadow Economy?   101
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
KOREA’S ATTEMPT TO REDUCE UNDERREPORTING 
IN RETAIL BUSINESSES
Efforts to Broaden the Tax Base
The history of domestic resource mobilization in the Republic of Korea is charac-
terized by the tax authority’s efforts to increase revenue and enhance tax equity by 
broadening the tax base, taxing in such a way as to finance Korea’s economic and 
social development needs. The National Tax Service was established as a separate 
organization from the Ministry of Finance in 1966 to mobilize more effectively the 
tax revenue needed to finance the country’s government-led national economic devel-
opment plan consisting of seven five-year plans that was introduced in 1962 and con-
cluded in 1996. In 1975, a global income tax on aggregate income, including labor 
income, business income, real estate rent income, and other miscellaneous incomes 
was introduced to enhance tax equity. Value-added tax was introduced in 1977 to 
enable evidence-based taxation and to prevent tax evasion by cross-checking VAT 
invoices. At that time, the government instituted a cross-check process by requiring 
taxpayers to submit all invoices when they filed VAT returns. Cross-checks are now 
done electronically through mandatory e-invoicing. In 1993, mandatory use of real 
names and a prohibition on the use of pseudonyms for financial transactions were 
introduced to enhance the transparency of financial transactions and to prevent illicit 
financial flows. The mandatory use of real names set the stage for the global financial 
income tax levied on aggregate financial incomes, including interest and dividends, 
introduced in 1996 to enhance tax equity for financial income.
Another drastic change in tax administration in 1996 was the shift from taxation 
based on government assessment to a voluntary system. Before the voluntary income 
tax return system was instituted, the National Tax Service either assessed taxpayer’s 
income tax liabilities based on their bookkeeping and other records or it accepted tax-
payer income tax returns that complied with preset standards or that reported income 
above the preset standard income-to-sales ratio the National Tax Service established 
for specific business sectors, geographical areas, and business scales. After abandon-
ing the government assessment system, however, the National Tax Service faced a 
big challenge: how could it verify taxpayers’ voluntary income tax returns? The most 
problematic areas were the business-to-consumer retail sectors with heavy cash trans-
actions; examples include professional service sectors, hotels, restaurants, bars, 
salons, pharmacies, and other retail stores. While business-to-business transactions 
were traceable through VAT invoice audit trails, business-to-consumer transactions, 
especially cash sales, could not be traced by tax authorities. End consumers had no 
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incentive to obtain receipts or report purchases to tax authorities, unlike businesses, 
which are able to claim input VAT credit against their output VAT. Accordingly, tax 
policy and tax administration authorities began exploring more fundamental 
approaches for creating audit trails for business-to-consumer cash transactions.
Introduction and Failure of Mandatory Cash Register Use 
Since 1977 when the VAT was introduced, Korea’s tax authorities have made 
efforts to effectively capture the sales of cash-intensive industries using the invoice 
credit VAT system. That same year, the Ministry of Finance rolled out comprehensive 
legal provisions to prevent underreporting in retail sectors.5 VAT law made the use of 
cash registers mandatory for designated cash-intensive businesses, and penalties were 
levied against business that failed to install cash registers, neglected to issue receipts, 
and altered cash sales.6 In addition to the deterrent measures, tax incentives were 
instituted for both retailers and consumers. Retailers using cash register received a 
tax credit against VAT payable (0.5% of cash-register-recorded sales). In addition, 
customers who collected and submitted cash-register-issued receipts to the govern-
ment were given cash compensation: 1% of the purchase value. In line with the gov-
ernment support for cash register use and receipt exchange in the retail sectors, 
Korea’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry and many consumer NGOs allied with 
the National Tax Service to run a nationwide campaign to educate and encourage 
retailers to issue receipts and consumers to ask for them.7 In fact, the receipt cam-
paign had been introduced in 1966, when the National Tax Service was established, 
but it was not particularly successful. It was relaunched when the VAT was intro-
duced. Believing that receipt-exchange practices were vital to the success of the 
newly adopted VAT and their efforts to tax on the basis of information and evidence, 
tax authorities strongly advocated that cash registers be installed in cash-intensive 
retail sectors and that retail businesses issue receipts to consumers.
These policy measures failed, however, despite continuous efforts by tax authori-
ties into the early 1990s. Retailers did install cash registers, but they were reluctant to 
 5. Article 32, VAT Law; articles 82 and 83 of VAT presidential decree, effective as of January 
1, 1977.
 6. The penalty was very strong: a 15-day business suspension for two detected instances of 
nonprovision of receipts or manipulation of cash sales within a 90-day period, and business 
closure for three detected instances. The penalty for failure to install cash registers was 
₩500,000.
 7. “Korea Chamber of Commerce Campaign for Issuing and Receiving Receipts,” Kyun-
ghyang Shinmun, January 18, 1977.
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issue receipts through them, and if consumers did not request receipts, they did not 
issue them and so were able to continuing dropping off cash sales to evade the tax 
burden. In response to taxpayers’ presumed underreporting and tax evasion, tax 
authorities even rejected retailers’ VAT and income tax returns and assessed much 
higher taxes above the sales recorded in the cash registers.8, 9 This move by tax 
authorities led to friction with taxpayers, criticism from the public, and distrust 
toward government policies and authorities. In addition, despite the lure of compen-
sation for obtaining cash register receipts, consumers did not actively do so because 
the application process for receipt compensation was cumbersome and inconvenient 
and the economic benefit was relatively small.10 Even worse, finding the system inef-
fective, the Korean government abruptly abolished receipt compensation program 
after only three years, thus eliminating the only incentive that might have helped con-
sumers come to appreciate the long term benefit of obtaining receipts.11
Distrust between taxpayers and tax authorities, the low tax morale of taxpayers, 
the repeal of the receipt compensation program, and functional defects in cash regis-
ters eroded the effectiveness of the cash register policy. Following the presidential 
and parliamentary elections in 1978, tax authorities sought to reduce friction with 
taxpayers, and in the early 1980s they almost totally suspended investigation into and 
penalties for failure to issue receipts.12 In 1988, the mandatory use of cash registers 
was de facto abolished, on the grounds that it had been enforced for the convenience 
of the tax administration and that it in fact discouraged the issuing and receiving of 
receipts, despite its original objectives, after a number of swings between strong 
enforcement and soft encouragement.13 In 1993, the article in the VAT law making 
 8. A news article in the Kyunghyang Shinmum (September 27, 1979) reported that cash regis-
ters became useless due to businesses’ neglect in issuing receipts and consumers’ lack of 
awareness of receipts. It also reported that fewer than 1 in 10 customers in restaurants 
obtained receipts, and no one obtained receipts in grocery stores. According to a taxpayer 
who equipped his business with a very expensive cash register at the urging of tax officials, 
tax inspectors did not assess taxes based on the cash register records but levied a 20% addi-
tional tax.
 9. “Equipped with an Expensive Cash Register but Distrusted,” Dong-a Ilbo, February 20, 
1979.
10. “Urgent to Make Receipt Exchange a Practice after One Year of Campaign,” Mail Econo-
my, February 7, 1978. 
11. “Receipt Compensation To Be Abolished Next Year after Three-Year Trial Proves Ineffec-
tive,” Dong-a Ilbo, September 24, 1979. 
12. “Enforcement of Cash Registers Is a Lost Cause,” Mail Economy, March 19, 1980; 
“Retarding VAT,” Dong-a Ilbo, April 14, 1981
13. “Retailers, Allowed to Use Cash Registers Voluntarily,” Mail Economy, August 2, 1988.
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cash register use mandatory was officially struck, and instead a statute was intro-
duced supporting voluntary use of cash registers.14 Tax credits to business sellers for 
issuing cash register receipts (0.5% of sales) were maintained to encourage voluntary 
cash register use. In 1996, however, even the tax credit for cash register receipts was 
repealed, as cash registers had proven ineffective in reducing underreporting of cash 
sales.15
The Introduction of TIETP
After the mandatory use of cash registers proved to be a failure, tax authorities in 
Korea decided to develop other policy and administrative options to prevent underre-
porting. In the late 1980s, they began to focus on electronic payments, such as credit 
card payments, that would enable tax authorities to follow the retail sectors’ audit 
trails. In 1984, the Ministry of Finance introduced regulations requiring large-scale 
businesses (above ₩10 billion in sales) to submit detailed lists of tax-deductible 
business entertainment expenses to the National Tax Service that were not paid using 
credit cards.16 In 1986, the National Tax Service requested that credit card companies 
submit taxpayers’ credit card transaction data, which it was allowed to do under the 
Credit Card Business Law for purposes of tax inquiries or investigations. The Nation-
al Tax Service thereafter began to use credit card transaction information to verify 
retail businesses’ tax returns (Jang 1997, p.178). The effects of this approach were 
limited, however, since cash was still used for a significant number of transactions.
From the mid-1990s on, when personal income taxation in Korea went from being 
a matter of government assessments to a matter of voluntary reporting, cash transac-
tions without receipts and underreporting became much more serious challenges to 
the Korean tax authorities. The National Tax Service would not assess taxpayers’ vol-
untary tax returns if it did not have clear counterevidence to taxpayers’ assertions, 
and it could no longer enforce income taxation on the basis of its own income-to-
sales ratio criteria.
In 1994, against this backdrop, the Ministry of Finance introduced a tax incentive 
for credit card use—0.5% of credit card sales would be credited to VAT payable for 
retail sellers dealing mainly in goods or services to consumers—and it abolished a 
14. Article 32, VAT Law, effective as of January 1, 1994.
15. Paragraph 2, article 32, VAT Law, effective as of January 1, 1996.
16. Article 44-3, Corporate Income Tax Presidential Decree, effective as of October 5, 1985, 
and Article 106-2, Personal Income Tax Presidential Decree, effective as of October 5, 
1985.
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similar tax credit for retailers who issued cash register receipts.17 Subsequently, in 
1996, the ministry increased the tax credit rate from 0.5 % to 1% (the ceiling of ₩3 
million was put in place beginning in 1999).18 As of January 1, 2000, the tax credit 
rate was increased to 2%, with a ceiling of ₩5 million.19 Policy slowly turned in the 
direction of favoring credit card payments over cash register receipts.
Allowing tax incentives to end consumers paying with credit cards was a conten-
tious issue, however. In 1995, the Ministry of Finance started to review tax deduc-
tions for wage earners who used credit cards to increase electronically traceable pay-
ments.20 In 1999, TIETP was finally introduced.21 TIETP is a completely different 
form of tax incentive for individual consumers. It gives tax incentives to the general 
public for almost all credit card payments, but even though this would suggest its fis-
cal impact would be substantial, its effectiveness in preventing underreporting has 
remained unclear. Korea already had experience in giving consumers incentives 
under the program that provided compensation for collecting cash register receipts, 
but this had proved to be a failure due to taxpayers’ disregard of cash register 
receipts, the inconvenient compensation application process, delays in compensation 
due to poor management, and the government’s slow budget allocation or budget 
shortfalls.22 Despite these problems in the implementation process, consumer com-
pensation nonetheless slowly took root, as evidenced by the compensation amounts 
disbursed: ₩1.4 billion in 1977, ₩2.76 billion in 1978, and ₩2.52 billon in the first 
half of 1979.23 This progress notwithstanding, the budget proposal for consumer 
compensation submitted by the National Tax Service was abruptly rejected by the 
Economic Planning Board after only three years of implementation on the grounds 
that it was costly and ineffective in reducing underreporting.24 The government poli-
17. Paragraph 1, Article 32-2, VAT Law, effective as of January 1, 1994.
18. Paragraph 1, article 32-2, VAT Law, effective as of January 1, 1996; paragraph 1, article 
32-2, VAT Law, effective as of January 1, 1999.
19. Paragraph 1, article 32-2, VAT Law, effective as of January 1, 2000.
20. “Tax Deduction for Credit Card Use,” Mail Economy, May 18, 1995; “Tax Deduction for 
Credit Card Use to Wage Earners,” Mail Economy, July 26, 1995.
21. Paragraph 126-2, Preferential Tax Control Law, effective as of August 31, 1999.
22. “Urgent to Make Receipt Exchange a Practice After One Year of Campaign,” Mail Econo-
my, February 7, 1978; “Delayed Compensation for Receipts Is Not a Trivial Problem,” 
Mail Economy, July 10, 1978; “Problems with Receipt Compensation,” Kyunghyang Shin-
mun, March 26, 1979; “Receipt Compensation,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, December 27, 
1979. 
23. “Receipt Compensation To Be Abolished Next Year after Three-Year Trial Proves Ineffec-
tive,” Dong-a Ilbo, September 25, 1979.
24. Ibid.
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cy encouraging receipt exchange in retail sectors to prevent underreporting and to 
enable evidence-based taxation was significantly undermined by this retrograde mea-
sure.25 After the revocation of the receipt compensation program, there were intermit-
tent requests for its reinstatement.26 But that did not happen until the introduction of 
TIETP in 1999.
Starting in 1998, the Ministry of Finance and Economy undertook a series of mea-
sures to encourage credit card payments in the belief that these would provide reli-
able tax information regarding sales in retail businesses and would contribute to 
enhancing business transaction transparency.27 First, the ministry revised the income 
tax and VAT laws to enable the National Tax Service to designate specific retail busi-
nesses primarily selling goods and services to individual consumers as cred-
it-card-membership target businesses and to strongly recommend to those businesses 
that they join this program.28 In practice, such recommendations made by the Nation-
al Tax Service, which had power to initiate tax audits, were seen as de facto mandato-
ry.29 Simultaneously, regulations pertaining to tax-deductible business entertainment 
expenses were strengthened, so that any business entertainment expense exceeding 
₩50,000 (approximately US$50) had to be paid for with a credit card or VAT invoice 
to be eligible for tax deduction.30 Such strict rules were believed to enhance transpar-
ency of business expenses and to uncover hidden sales by retail businesses.
The Ministry of Finance and Economy took care to prevent TIETP from introduc-
ing double tax deductions; for example, medical expenses or insurance premiums 
25. “After the Abolishment of Receipts Compensation, Receipt Exchange Petering Out,” Mail 
Economy, August 26, 1980. 
26. “Introduction of Receipts Compensation Desirable, Effective in Reducing Underground 
Economy,” Mail Economy, April 6, 1983; “NTS Reviews Revival of Receipt Compensa-
tion,” Mail Economy, May 18, 1985; “The Federation of Korean Industries Suggests Intro-
ducing Tax Deduction for Receipts or Reviving Receipt Compensation,” Dong-a Ilbo, 
August 5, 1985; “NTS, Insufficient Measures for Receipts Exchange,” Mail Economy, 
November 4, 1985.
27. “Mandatory Credit Card Membership for Hospitals, Pharmacies, and Hotel Businesses,” 
HanKyoreh, June 5, 1998.
28. Article 162-2, Income Tax Law, effective as of January 1, 1999; article 32-2, VAT Law, 
effective as of January 1, 1999.
29. “Mandatory Credit Card Membership for Hospitals, Pharmacies, and Hotel Businesses,” 
HanKyoreh, June 5, 1998; “Hospitals, Private Educational Institutions, Restaurants, Hotel 
Businesses Will Be Subject to Tax Investigation, If They Show a Decline in Credit Card 
Payments,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, December 14, 1998.
30. Article 35, Income Tax Law, effective as of January 1, 1999; article 25, Corporate Income 
Tax Law, effective as of January 1, 1999. 
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deductible from wage income under the income tax law could also be tax deductible 
under TIETP if they were paid for by credit card, leading to a double deduction. In 
July 1999, the ministry announced that it had made adjustments to TIETP that would 
eliminate double deductions and minimize the fiscal impact of the new experiment.
RATIONALE FOR TIETP
Policy Shift to Measures Aimed at End Consumers
Policy experiments adopted by Korean tax authorities to date to reduce underre-
porting in the retail sectors are presented in table 4, following the framework present-
ed in table 3. Deterrent measures such as mandatory cash register installation and 
penalties for not issuing receipts proved to be failures and were abandoned. Policies 
encouraging compliance by sellers and buyers, including tax incentives for cash reg-
ister receipts and cash compensation to consumers for submitting receipts, were 
transformed into tax incentives for credit card sales and TIETP.





* monitoring and auditing  
  (underreporting)
* penalties for failing to issue receipts 
  (underreporting)







* tax incentives for issuing cash 
  register receipts (underreporting)
<B-I cell>
* cash compensation for securing 
  receipts (underreporting)





<S-N cell> <B-N cell>
* campaign and education on receipt 
  exchange (underreporting)
* campaign and education on receipt 
  exchange (underreporting)
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Korea’s experience prior to introducing TIETP was that deterrent measures were 
ineffective. Normative approaches were also not effective in Korea, a strongly gov-
ernment-led country in which public education and awareness campaigns, intrusive 
government guides, and recommendations are rampant. In addition, push policies tar-
geting business sellers, including tax incentives for cash register receipts, were inef-
fective, because the benefits of this incentive did not compare to the illegal gains sell-
ers could make from underreporting, especially in a society with low tax morale. 
Therefore, the question became whether a pull policy encouraging end consumers to 
provide third-party information would be effective in reducing underreporting. Under 
the invoice credit VAT system, business buyers report business sellers’ sales by 
claiming their input VAT credit in business-to-business transactions. In busi-
ness-to-consumer transactions, however, end consumers do not provide tax authori-
ties with any information on business sellers’ sales. Therefore, pull policies encourag-
ing end consumers to play an active role in providing such information could be a 
very powerful tool for unveiling hidden transactions in cash businesses. If end con-
sumers, encouraged by tax incentives, used electronically traceable payment means 
for purchases, tax authorities could access secure and reliable sales data on cash-in-
tensive businesses. In the period after Korea revoked what hindsight shows to have 
been a poorly managed receipt compensation policy, he economic and social land-
scape of the country changed dramatically. In this altered landscape, TIETP was con-
sidered to be a different pull strategy for tackling cash transaction practices and 
breaking the collusive relationships among participants in the shadow economy.
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With the expectation that end consumers would switch to using credit cards if 
given tax incentives for doing so, Korea moved from seller-deterrent policies (S-D) 
and seller- and buyer-normative policies (S-N and B-N) that had failed in 1970s and 
1980s to buyer-incentivizing and seller-incentivizing policies (B-I and S-I) at the end 
of 1990s. The following figure conceptually describes Korea’s policy shifts and its 
aim to curb the shadow economy in retail sectors.
TIETP Theoretical Framework
The effect of TIETP is represented by the payoff matrix in table 5, illustrating the 
games business sellers and end consumers play in the market. First, if it were not for 
TIETP, end consumers would not have any incentive to use credit cards when pur-
chasing goods and services in retail markets. The end consumer’s payoff is zero, 
whether using credit cards or cash, in the absence of the tax benefit provided by 
TIETP. However, that is not the case for a business seller. If a customer does not use 
a credit card and the seller does not report the sale, then seller’s payoff will be, for 
example, 10 (gain from tax evasion). However, if a customer uses a credit card, the 
seller is expected to report the sale, and so the seller’s payoff will be zero (no gain) in 
that case, or, if the seller doesn’t report the sale, then the payoff will be, for example, 
-20 (loss from the detection and punishment). Therefore, the equilibrium, in most 
cases, will be the worst case, the shaded area of the left matrix of table 5 (“does not 
use credit card–does not report”). That is because a seller has a strong incentive not to 
report sales to maximize payoffs when customers do not use credit cards. Sometimes, 
in expensive deals, a seller may collude with the customer in order to share the tax 
benefit; such payoffs are displayed in parenthesis.
Introducing TIETP to give tax benefits to end consumers, however, can alter the 
equilibrium. TIETP gives end consumers incentives to use credit cards, making the 
payoffs to end consumers 2, for instance, as shown in the right payoff matrix in table 
5. The payoffs for business sellers are the same as without TIETP. In that case, the pos-
sibility with the highest payoff will be the case where end consumers request to use a 
credit card and business sellers report the sales accordingly (“uses credit card–reports,” 
the shaded area of the right matrix). Nonetheless, again, sellers and buyers may collude 
to share benefits. For example, sellers can offer customers lower prices when they 
evade taxes and can request that their customers not use credit cards, especially for 
expensive transactions, the payoffs of which are displayed in parentheses in table 5. 
TIETP clearly cannot eliminate all underreporting. However, we can expect that, in 
most ordinary retail transactions, such as take place in restaurants, bars, pharmacies, 
and other small retail stores, the equilibrium will be “uses credit card–reports.”
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 Table 5. Payoff Matrix with and without TIETP
If the equilibrium changes from “does not use credit card–does not report” to “uses 
credit card–reports” with TIETP, then even if sellers and end consumers collude to 
share the benefits of tax evasion on expensive transactions, TIETP might contribute to 
curtailing the shadow economy. According to Jang’s survey (1997), conducted before 
TIETP’s introduction, while only 8.9% of survey respondents obtained receipts in 
retail stores, approximately 90% answered that they would pay with a credit card if the 
government introduced tax deductions for credit card payments.31 Another survey’s 
results showed that 75.8% of respondents would use credit cards more frequently if 
tax incentives for their use were introduced.32
TIETP Incentive Structures
The Ministry of Finance and Economy designed TIETP in such a way as to limit 
the fiscal impact of the policy. TIETP offers tax deductions only on taxable labor 
income. It does not allow tax deductions on business income, real-estate rent income, 
or forest income, since expenses related to those incomes were already tax deductible 
under income tax law. The credit card tax deduction is limited at both ends by a mini-
31. 56% used credit cards without exception; 5%  only shopped at credit card member stores; 
26% used credit cards even for small amounts; 10% said they did not have much interest in 
using credit cards; 2% said they had no interest; and 1% did not respond.
32. “Credit Cards Would be Used More If Tax Incentives for Credit Card Use Were Introduced: 
Samsung Card’s Survey to 300 Customers,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, July 19, 1999.
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mum threshold and a maximum ceiling, and it also includes a sunset clause. Until 
2002, eligible income deductions were allowed at 10% of the amount of electronically 
traceable payments, including credit card or debit card payments exceeding 10% of 
total labor income in a taxable year, within the ceiling set at the lesser of ₩3million 
(approximately US$2,600) or 10% of total labor income.33 To avoid double deduc-
tions, insurance premiums paid to public insurance funds, including national health 
insurance, national employment insurance, and the national pension fund, and for 
commercial indemnity insurance, as well as tuition and entrance fees paid to public 
and private regular educational institutions, are excluded from the category of eligible 
electronically traceable payments.34 In addition, national and local taxes; utility pay-
ments, including electricity, water, telephone, television, heating and cooking fuel gas, 
and so on; and transactions abroad are excluded, as such payments are not typically 
underreported.35 However, medical expenses that exceed the deduction threshold 
under income tax law are included in an effort to reduce underreporting in medical 
service sectors.
Since TIETP was introduced in 1999, it has been revised a number of times. Its 
sunset clause has been extended every successive sunset year, thus leaving TIETP in 
effect. In addition, in 2001, TIETP was strengthened. The deduction rate was 
increased from 10% to 20%, and the ceiling on deductions was also increased to the 
lesser of ₩5 million or 20% of total labor income. In 2003, after overconsumption 
and credit card debt defaults had become social problems, the deduction rate for debit 
cards was increased to 30% to encourage the use of debit cards over credit cards. 
Starting in 2005, the government began to increase the deduction threshold. It went 
from 10% of total labor income to 15% in 2005, to 20% in 2008, and to 25% in 2010. 
In 2010, the deduction ceiling was lowered from ₩5 million to ₩3 million. The 
deduction rate for credit cards was also lowered, from 20% to 15% in 2013. However, 
in 2012 and 2013, TIETP was expanded again when payments to vendors in tradition-
al markets and for public transportation costs were added as eligible electronically 
traceable payments for nontax policy purposes. Table 6, the information for which has 
been compiled from the National Laws and Regulation Database, summarizes the 
changes to TIETP made since 1999.
33. Article 126-2, Preferential Tax Control Law, effective as of August 31, 1999.
34. Article 121-2, presidential decree of Preferential Tax Control Law, effective as of October 
30, 1999.
35. Ibid.
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for TIETP Deduction Ceiling 
1999
credit cards
10% 10% × total labor income
Min(10% 
× TLI,W 3 million)debit cards
2001 debit cards 20% 10% × total labor income
Min(20% 
× TLI,W 5 million)
2003
credit cards 20% 10% × total labor 
income
Min(20% 
× TLI,W 5 million)debit cards 30%
2004
credit cards
20% 10% × total labor income
Min(20% 




2005 electronically traceable cash receipts added 20%
15% × total labor 
income
Min(20% 
× TLI,W 5 million)
2006 electronically traceable cash receipts 15%
15% × total labor 
income
Min(20% 
× TLI,W 5 million)
2008 electronically traceable cash receipts 20%
20% × total labor 
income
Min(20% 
× TLI,W 5 million)
2010
credit cards 20%
25% × total labor 
income
Min( 20% 
× TLI,W 3 million)
debit cards, bearer-





25% × total labor 
income
Min( 20% 
× TLI,W 3 million)
debit cards, bearer-
identifiable prepaid cards 30%
electronically traceable 
cash receipts 20%
traditional market use 30%
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for TIETP Deduction Ceiling 
2013
credit cards 15%
25% × total labor 
income
Min( 20%  
×TLI,W 3 million)
debit cards, bearer-
identifiable prepaid cards 30%
electronically traceable 
cash receipts 30%
traditional market use 30%
public transportation use 30%
The TIETP Process
Wage earners eligible for tax deductions for credit card payments may submit to 
the National Tax Service, via their employers, the credit card tax deduction application 
form and a credit card transaction report issued by their credit card companies. These 
materials must accompany the wage earners’ labor income tax filing from the end of 
the tax year. Credit card companies may voluntarily issue credit card transaction 
reports to their customers, or they may issue them upon request.36 After TIETP was 
introduced, credit card companies began voluntarily sending their customers annual 
transaction reports at the end of the tax year as a customer service. In 2000, when 
TIETP was fully implemented, the Act on the Submission and Management of Taxa-
tion Data became law. According to the act, credit card companies must regularly sub-
mit member stores’ credit card and debit card transaction data to the National Tax Ser-
vice. As of 2012, wage earners can claim TIETP tax deductions by confirming pre-
filled credit card transactions data forms provided by the National Tax Service through 
its Home Tax Service, the National Tax Service tax service internet portal, which was 
created as per the terms of the act.
If the credit card tax deduction application is valid, employers, acting as the with-
holding tax agents of wage earners’ income, subtract the taxes saved by TIETP togeth-
er with other tax deductions and credits from the tax due in the month following the 
year-end tax settlement.37 If the withholding tax agents should refund overpaid taxes, 
they can subtract the refund amount from the taxes due in subsequent months or 
36. Ibid.
37. Article 201, presidential decree of Income Tax Law; article 93, Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance order for Income Tax Law.
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request a refund from the regional National Tax Service office.38
The TIETP process differs completely from the receipt compensation process 
adopted in 1977. People who wanted to receive receipt compensation had to fill out a 
cumbersome application. They had to collect their receipts and take them to a regional 
National Tax Service office or commercial bank commissioned to deal with receipt 
compensation. Since compensations came out of an allotted budget, consumers often 
could not get their compensation due to delayed budget allocations or budget short-
falls. The TIETP application and refund process, in contrast, is easy and simple. The 
tax deduction is credited to wage earners’ income taxes along with other tax deduc-
tions and credits, so refunds due are not delayed or declined. In addition, applicants do 
not need to collect all the credit card receipts, as credit companies issue aggregate 
annual transaction reports, and now prefilled credit card transaction information is pre-
sented to taxpayers by the National Tax Service Home Tax Service.
Expansion of Electronically Traceable Payments: Electronically Traceable 
Cash Receipts
After the introduction of tax incentives for credit card use in 1999, Korea intro-
duced electronically traceable cash receipts and made them an eligible form of elec-
tronic payment for TIETP in 2005. These receipts make even cash payments electroni-
cally traceable by the National Tax Service. People who for any reason prefer to pay in 
cash rather than using a credit card can ask retailers to issue these receipts to them. 
The consumer provides a resident registration number (Korean citizens’ ID number), a 
registered mobile phone number, or a credit or debit card number for personal identifi-
cation purposes; the retailer then issues the electronically traceable cash receipt 
through its credit card payment terminal. Transaction data is automatically relayed to 
the National Tax Service. End consumers do not need to collect these receipts to 
receiver their income tax deduction; the National Tax Service provides electronically 
traceable cash receipt transaction data to wage earners, together with credit card and 
debit card transaction information, through the Home Tax Service portal. Wage earn-
ers just confirm their prefilled electronically traceable cash receipt, credit card, and 
debit card transaction data and submit the TIETP application to their employers.
Expansion to Mobile Transactions
TIETP also allows the purchase of goods and services by using credit cards and 
38. Ibid.
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debit cards on a mobile phone even without an app. Therefore, business-to-consumer 
mobile phone transactions in Korea now fall into the TIETP category. In addition, the 
National Tax Service has made efforts to reinforce its mobile tax service. Since 2005, 
the National Tax Service has provided a mobile tax-related certificate issuing service, 
covering a range of documents, such as business registration certificates, tax payment 
certificates, and business closure certificates.39 In 2014, the National Tax Service start-
ed a mobile newsletter service offering tax news, tax return and payment notifications, 
and information on tax legislation and rulings.40 In 2015, the National Tax Service 
began providing a mobile Home Tax Service allowing taxpayers to issue electronically 
traceable cash receipt and e-invoices and to receive other tax-related services, includ-
ing tax returns, tax inquiries, tax certifications, and the tax news service on their 
mobile phones.41
TIETP PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section investigates whether incentive measures encouraging end consumers 
to use electronically traceable payments help reduce underreporting in cash-intensive 
retail sectors. First, as a descriptive analysis, we examine the volume of electronically 
traceable payments, the taxpayer ratio as a percentage of business income earners, and 
effective personal income tax rates in Korea, which provide broad evidence for reduc-
tions in underreporting. We then estimate TIETP’s quantitative tax revenue effects 
using counterfactual analysis.
Descriptive Analysis for TIETP
Increase in Electronically Traceable Payments
TIETP allows wage and salary income earners to claim tax deductions for their 
credit card, debit/check card, and bearer-identifiable prepaid card spending, which is 
believed to have substantially increased the number of cashless payments since its 
introduction in 1999. Figure 4 shows the volume of electronically traceable payments 
39. “Mobile Tax Certificates Service Launch,” National Tax Service press release, December 
27, 2005.
40. “NTS Mobile Newsletter Service Launch,” National Tax Service press release, July 21, 
2014.
41. “User Friendly Mobile NTS App Service Launch,” National Tax Service press release, 
October 29, 2015.
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as a percentage of GDP from 1991 to 2014. Credit card transactions increased very 
sharply immediately after TIETP’s introduction in 1999. They had been merely 4.9% 
in 1999, but they had skyrocketed to 34.3% by 2002. In absolute terms, electronically 
traceable payments soared from ₩28.5 trillion (approximately US$26 billion) to 
₩261.7 trillion (approximately US$238 billion) during the same period.
Since 2003, when the government increased the TIETP deduction rate for debit 
cards increased from 20% to 30% to encourage their use over credit cards, debit card 
payments have risen sharply. In 2005, the electronically traceable cash receipt was 
made eligible for TIETP. These changes, seem to have induced consumers to switch to 
these alternative methods of payment, moderating the increase of credit card transac-
tions since 2003, as shown in figure 4, which is based on our aggregation of data from 
Bank of Korea.
Figure 4. Credit, Debit, and Prepaid Card Transactions as Percentage of GDP
Source: Authors’ aggregation of data from Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr).
Notes: a. Debit card payments include check cards. b. Electronically traceable cash receipt payments are 
not included. c. Payments by all consumers, including not only wage and salary income earners 
but also self-employed businesses.
In 2014, the total value of credit, debit, check, and prepaid cards, not including 
electronically traceable cash receipts, reached ₩631.6 trillion (approximately US$574 
billion), 42.5% of GDP. Since 2005, card payments as a ratio to GDP in Korea have 
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Market Infrastructures, Bank for International Settlements.42
If electronically traceable cash receipt payments (₩91.9 trillion in 2014) are 
included, electronically traceable payments as a ratio of GDP is around 49% for 
2014.43  The data used for figure 4 does not include electronically traceable payments, 
but it does include check cards and represents payments by all consumers, including 
not only wage and salary income earners but also self-employed businesses.
Table 7. Electronically Traceable Payments as Percentage of Private Final Consumption 
               Expenditure
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Private Final Consumption 
Expenditure (  )





card (  )
190.5 214.8 241.1 279.3 303.9 350.7 398.5 451.3 441.7 453.9 503.6
check 
card (  )
7.8 12.7 18.8 27.9 36.7 51.5 66.9 82.8 92.7 112.7 131.5
cash 
receipt (④)
18.6 30.6 50.2 61.5 68.7 76.0 80.9 82.4 85.5 91.7 96.6
National 
taxes, etc. (⑤)
·· ·· ·· ·· ·· ·· 8.1 19.2 18.9 22.6 46.3
sum (⑤=  +    
  + ④ - ⑤)
216.9 258.1 310.1 368.7 409.3 478.2 538.2 597.3 601.0 635.7 685.4
Ratio ( ⑤/  ) 45.2% 50.6% 56.8% 63.7% 68.8% 75.1% 79.3% 84.4% 82.5% 85.0% 88.9%
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance.
Note: ·· = negligible.
Table 7 shows the increase in electronically traceable payments as compared to pri-
vate final consumption expenditure, which the Ministry of Strategy and Finance put 
together from private final consumption expenditure data (Bank of Korea), credit card 
and check card payments (the Credit Finance Association), debit card payments (Bank 
of Korea), and cash receipts (National Tax Service). Business card payments were 
42. Card payments (not including e-money) as a ratio to GDP was 30.5% in 2005, 36.7% in 
2010, and 42.5% in 2014. Data retrieved from statistics on payment, clearing, and settle-
ment systems in countries that are members of the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures.
43. Electronically traceable credit card payments totaled ₩18.6 trillion in 2005, ₩76.0 trillion 
in 2010, and ₩91.0 trillion in 2014. Data retrieved from Statistical Yearbook of National 
Tax (NTS 2006–2015).
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subtracted from credit card and check card payments and national taxes, and four 
national insurance premiums paid by credit cards were subtracted from electronically 
traceable payments. The proportion of these payments compared to private final con-
sumption expenditure increased from 45.2% in 2005 to 88.9% in 2015. The absolute 
majority of private consumption, other than indispensable cash transactions, are now 
paid with electronically traceable payments in Korea, which brings the country near to 
having a cashless society.
Increased Tax Net for Business Income
In many countries, business income earned by the self-employed is more frequent-
ly underreported than is wage and salary income, due to the lack of third-party infor-
mation accessible to tax authorities (Pissarides & Weber 1989; Lyssiotou, Pashardes, 
& Stengos 2004; Gërxhani 2004; Wangen 2005; Martinez-Lopez 2012). Korea is no 
exception. According to Sung (1999, p.69), between 1994 and 1998, before the intro-
duction of TIETP, only about half of business income earned by the self-employed 
was reported to the National Tax Service. Such low tax compliance among owner-op-
erated businesses often led to a low number of active taxpayers as a percentage of rele-
vant income earners.
Figure 5. Personal Income Taxpayers as Percentage of Relevant Income Earners (%)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of National Tax (National Tax Service, 1988–
2015).
Note: The ratio of wage and salary income to taxpayers decreased dramatically in 2014 due to changes in 
the personal income tax income deduction system in 2014. The income deduction for education 
expenses, medical expenses, private insurance premiums, and charity contributions were shifted to 
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As shown in figure 5, the ratio of taxpayer to business income earners in Korea lin-
gered aground 30% from early 1980s to the mid-1990s, but it began to increase gradu-
ally and substantially from the late 1990s onward. It rose to about 50% in the early 
2000s and dramatically to 86.4% in 2014. Such an upward trend in the business 
income could be attributable to higher nominal income due to economic growth and, 
in some part, to inflation (the inflation rate is low in Korea and thus has a moderate 
effect). Since Korea has increased the personal income tax exemption threshold only 
once, in 2008 (from ₩10 million to ₩12 million), after introducing TIETP in 1999, 
and since it does not adopt inflation-adjusted personal income tax brackets, income 
increases may result in a higher active taxpayer ratio. However, given the economic 
growth and inflation effects at all times, it seem more likely that TIETP is the cause of 
the upward trend.
Effective Personal Income Tax Rate for Owner-Operated Businesses
The effective personal income tax rates are estimated through microsimulation 
analysis developed by Sung (2008) using Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
data, a household survey data set, collected monthly and compiled, and released by 
Statistics Korea every quarter year. This data provide monthly and quarterly income 
and expenditures, along with each household’s demographic characteristics, that can 
be used to estimate household personal income tax. Detailed personal income tax esti-
mation methods using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey and summary 
statistics of the survey are attached in appendixes 1 and 2.
Figure 6, drawing on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (Statistics 
Korea, 1982–2014), illustrates the longitudinal changes of effective personal income 
tax rates both for self-employed business income and wage and salary income for the 
last three decades. The two effective personal income tax rates have different trends. 
The effective personal income tax rate of wage and salary income increased from 
1.6% to 4.0% from 1982 to 1988 and then oscillated within the range of 2.2% to 3.5% 
from 1989 until recently. For business income, the effective personal income tax rate 
decreased from 5.6% to 3.4% from 1982 to 1998 but turned to a continuous upward 
trend from 3.4% in 1998 to 6.3% in 2013 after the introduction of TIETP, except for 
the two dips caused by Korea’s economic crises in 2002–2003 and 2008–2009.
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Figure 6. Effective Personal Income Tax Rate for Business Income and Wage 
                and Salary Income (%)
Source: Author’s estimation using Household Income and Expenditure Survey (Statistics Korea, 1982–
2014).
These two different trends since 1999 show that TIETP contributed to the broaden-
ing tax base for self-employed businesses while it alleviated wage and salary earners’ 
tax burdens. Since the introduction of TIETP in 1999, wage and salary earners have 
actively used credit cards to get the tax incentives and, as a result, self-employed busi-
ness income earners have reported their business income more honestly, mindful that 
third parties were reporting transactions to the tax authorities. These trends give broad 
support to the theoretical framework—the TIETP-induced equilibrium change from 
“does not use credit card–does not report” to “uses credit card–reports”—discussed in 
the previous section. It should be noted, however, that just as in the case of the active 
taxpayer ratio, the upward trend in the effective personal income tax rate of business 
income may be a function of nominal income increases due to economic growth and 
inflation, fixed income tax brackets, and personal income tax exemption thresholds. 
However, such creeping effects might not have been realized automatically without 
TIETP, because business owners tend to underreport business income to offset such 
effects.
One notable phenomenon in this personal income tax rate trend is that the effective 
personal income tax rate of business income is greater than that of wage and salary 
income, without exception, for the whole period considered. This runs against the 
common understanding that self-employed workers’ business income tends to be 
underreported. One possible interpretation is that the Korean personal income tax sys-
tem allows more generous income deductions to wage and salary earners because 
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self-employed workers’ business income is underreported in the absence of third-party 
information. Another interpretation is that the average income of the self-employed is 
greater than that of employed workers, and as a result the self-employed are subject to 
a higher progressive income tax schedule.
Quantitative Analysis for TIETP
Methodology and Data
TIETP’s effects were analyzed using microsimulation methods through counterfac-
tual analysis adopted by Song and Sung (2012). This study updates the Song and Sung 
(2012) approach, using 2014 the Household Income and Expenditure Survey data set. 
Three different scenarios were set up to evaluate policy effects by establishing the 
counterfactual and the observable. When we estimated true business income in each 
scenario, we adjusted income data obtained from Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey on the assumption that it was also underreported, as in tax reporting.44 Real 
business incomes were estimated by comparing the income and expenditures of 
self-employed workers with those of wage and salary earners. The ratio of business 
income reported to tax authorities over real business income as of 2014 was estimated 
by applying the same method employed in Sung (1999, 2008). Business income 
reported to tax authorities per household was estimated with the real business income 
and income reporting ratio obtained in the previous step. The personal income tax bur-
den was calculated based on the business income reported to tax authorities as well as 
demographics and expenditure data obtained from Household Income and Expendi-
ture Survey. However, it was assumed that wage and salary income were reported cor-
rectly. The detailed methodology is described in the appendix 2. Following are the 
three scenarios employed.
Scenario A (counterfactual scenario 1: baseline): Average personal income tax 
burden per household in 2014 was estimated under the assumption that business 
income earners reported their income based on the past increasing trend without the 
intervention of TIETP. The average reported business income in 2014 was estimated 
by extrapolating the past ratio of business income earners’ reported income to their 
real income. In this study, Sung’s estimate (1999) for the ratio of business income 
earners’ reported income to real income in 1996 (47.7%) and another Sung estimate 
44. Hurst, Li, and Pugsley 2014 show that in U.S. household surveys the self-employed 
systematically underreport their income by about 25%. 
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(2008) for 2001 (53.9%) were used to linearly extrapolate the estimate for 2014.45 We 
specifically used the 2001 estimate for extrapolation because the estimates between 
1997 and 2000 were outliers due to the financial crisis in Korea and because if the 
2001 estimate affected by TIETP at the early stages of TIETP introduction was extrap-
olated as a baseline, it would underestimate the effect of TIETP when compared to the 
observable. In other words, considering that the extrapolation using inflated data 
would result in a conservative estimate of the TIETP effect, we compromised by using 
the 2001 estimate.
It was assumed that this counterfactual scenario only included tax-base-broadening 
effects caused by factors other than TIETP. Those factors could be taxpayers’ volun-
tary compliance, tax authorities’ tax enforcement efforts, or other unknown socioeco-
nomic changes. Therefore, this counterfactual scenario reflected all causal factors 
other than TIETP, thus differentiating them from TIETP effects.
Scenario B (counterfactual scenario 2): The average personal income tax burden 
per household in 2014 was estimated under the assumption that TIETP is in effect but 
has not led to tax losses. The average reported business income was estimated by 
applying the ratio of reported business income to real business income, which reflect-
ed the base-broadening effects of TIETP. However, when estimating the personal 
income tax burden, contrary to the facts, tax forgone by the underwriting of TIETP 
was not factored in. Accordingly, this scenario shows the gross effect of TIETP’s base 
broadening as of 2014 under the assumption that the same tax-base-broadening effects 
caused by TIETP were realized without tax revenue loss.
Scenario C (observable scenario): The average personal income tax burden per 
household in 2014 was estimated under the current personal income tax law, as of 
2014, which includes TIETP. Tax forgone was also factored in when calculating the 
average personal income tax burden.
The comparison among these scenarios shows how much TIETP broadened the tax 
base and increased tax revenue on average in 2014 and how much tax revenue was 
forgone to finance TIETP. The difference between scenarios A and B ( ) illustrates the 
gross base-broadening effect of TIETP on tax revenue. The difference between scenar-
ios B and C ( ) reveals the revenue cost to finance TIETP. The gap between the two 
differences ( - ) is the net gain of TIETP. TIETP is justified only if its net gain is pos-
itive.
45. When the two data points (Yt1, t1) and (Yt2, t1) are given, the linear extrapolation function is 
be Y(t*) =           ×(t*-t1 ) + Yt1. In our case, it is Y(t*) =1.24t*-2427.34. Therefore, the 
reported income to real income ratio in 2014 was Y(2014)=70.1(%).
Yt2-Yt1
t2-t1
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Tax Revenue Effects of TIETP
Table 8 illustrates the average income and personal income tax estimation per 
household by decile as of 2014, which we have estimated using data from the House-
hold Income and Expenditure Survey 2014. The first nine rows display the distribu-
tions of the average income, personal income tax burdens, and the revenue effects of 
TIETP by decile as of 2014. The next six rows indicate the relative ratios of each 
income and personal income tax to gross income. The following three rows indicate 
the ratios of personal income tax burdens to wage and salary income or business 
income, that is, the effective personal income tax rates. The last six rows indicate the 
shares of each income and personal income tax by decile.
Gross revenue effects of TIETP, the difference between scenarios B and A ranges 
from ₩3,000 to ₩704,000 by decile. Tax forgone to finance TIETP, the difference 
between scenarios B and C ranges from ₩0 to ₩317,000. Therefore, net gains of 
TIETP range from ₩3,000 to ₩387,000. On average, gross revenue effects of TIETP 
are ₩186,000; the cost of TIETP is ₩108,000 and the net effect is ₩78,000. In sum, 
TIETP is quite costly but still yields positive tax revenue increases.
Figure 7 graphically shows these revenue effects. Net gains in the personal income 
tax burden increase as income does. The net gain curve is upward at an accelerating 
rate. In particular, revenue gains in 10th docile are striking. TIETP increases the per-
sonal income tax burden of higher income earners more than that of lower income 
earners, although it gives more tax relief to them.
Table 8. Distribution of Average Income and Personal Income Tax Burden per     
               Household by Gross Income Decile
(Thousand \) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Avg.
Market Income 6,425 13,526 20,948 28,186 34,946 40,503 49,322 58,353 71,975 106,312 43,046
Gross Income 10,456 18,383 25,769 32,866 39,752 46,557 54,083 63,508 77,086 112,455 48,088
Wage/ Salary 




scenario A 10 72 191 378 698 1,015 1,500 2,437 3,741 8,670 1,871
scenario B 13 88 235 454 812 1,175 1,694 2,678 4,057 9,374 2,057




GE (B-A) 3 16 44 76 114 160 194 241 316 704 186
TF (C-B) 0 -5 -11 -26 -73 -101 -128 -178 -241 -317 -108
net effect 
(gross effect 
+ tax revenue 
foregone)
3 11 33 50 41 59 66 63 75 387 78
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Ratios to Gross 
Income (%) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Avg.
Market Income 61.45 73.58 81.29 85.76 87.91 87 91.2 91.88 93.37 94.54 89.52
Gross Income 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Wage/ Salary 




scenario A 0.1 0.39 0.74 1.15 1.76 2.18 2.77 3.84 4.85 7.71 3.89
scenario B 0.13 0.48 0.91 1.38 2.04 2.52 3.13 4.22 5.26 8.34 4.28
scenario C 0.12 0.45 0.87 1.3 1.86 2.31 2.9 3.94 4.95 8.05 4.05
Ratios to Wage/ 
Salary and Business 
Income (%)




scenario A 0.29 0.74 1.12 1.56 2.19 2.69 3.23 4.44 5.5 8.71 4.76
scenario B 0.37 0.9 1.37 1.88 2.54 3.12 3.65 4.88 5.97 9.41 5.23
scenario C 0.35 0.85 1.31 1.77 2.32 2.85 3.37 4.55 5.61 9.09 4.96
Shares by Decile (%) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Total
Market Income 1.49 3.14 4.87 6.55 8.12 9.41 11.46 13.56 16.72 24.7 100




0.91 2.48 4.35 6.16 8.12 9.59 11.82 13.96 17.30 25.33 100
Personal 
Income Tax
scenario A 0.06 0.39 1.02 2.02 3.73 5.42 8.02 13.03 20.00 46.35 100
scenario B 0.06 0.43 1.14 2.21 3.95 5.71 8.23 13.02 19.72 45.56 100
scenario C 0.06 0.43 1.15 2.19 3.79 5.51 8.03 12.82 19.57 46.46 100
Source: Authors’ estimation using data from HIES 2014.
Figure 7. Tax Revenue Effects of TIETP per Household by Decile in 2014
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Table 9 shows the total personal income tax revenue effect, which was calculated 
by multiplying the average personal income tax burden per household and the total 
number of households (18,001,541 households in 2014). The total gross effect of 
TIETP was ₩3.4 trillion, while the cost of TIETP reached ₩1.9 trillion. The net gain 
was estimated at ₩1.4 trillion (approximately US$1.3 billion), which increased per-
sonal income tax revenue by 4.2% as compared to baseline scenario A without the 
intervention of TIETP. If the revenue increase in VAT and corporate income tax were 
taken into account, the revenue impact of TIETP would be much larger.
Table 9. Total Personal Income Tax Revenue Impact of TIETP
Participation Avg. (Thousands in ₩) Total (Billions in ₩)
Personal 
Income Tax
scenario A 1,871 33,675
scenario B 2,057 37,036
scenario C 1,949 35,090
Revenue 
Effect
gross revenue effect (B-A)  186  3,361 (10.0%)
tax revenue forgone (C-B) -108 -1,946 (-5.8%)
net effect (gross effect + tax 
revenue forgone)  78 1,415 (4.2%)
Note: Numbers in parentheses under “revenue effect” indicate the percentage increase from the revenue 
in baseline scenario A.
Effects on Tax Equality
Table 10 shows changes in the Gini coefficient between gross income and gross 
income less personal income tax. Personal income tax under the baseline scenario A, 
without the intervention of TIETP, decreases the Gini coefficient from 0.3357 to 
0.3230 by -3.79%. When TIETP is taken into account (as in scenario C), it decreases 
to 0.3227 by -3.90%. However, this enhancement of income redistribution is under-
mined by 0.14 percentage points (from -4.04% to -3.90%) by the tax forgone to 
finance TIETP, which is unevenly given to higher income deciles due to the progres-
sive tax structure. The Gini coefficient would decrease to 0.32216 by -4.04% if the tax 
broadening effect of TIETP did not entail tax forgone. In sum, TIETP had a positive 
impact on income redistribution due to the broadened tax base, despite the greater tax 
relief given to higher income earners. The Gini coefficient decreased by 0.11 percent-
age points (from -3.79% to -3.90%) This means that the tax-base-broadening effect of 
TIETP on income redistribution outweighs its negative effect on income redistribution 
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caused by tax relief, and as a result it eventually enhances income redistribution.
Table 10. Changes of Gini Coefficients
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Market Income 0.36942
Gross Income 0.33574
Gross Income Less Personal 
Income Tax 0.32303 0.32216 0.32265
% Change between Gross Income 




TIETP incentivizes end consumers to pay electronically for their purchases, and at 
the same time, it induces owner-operated retail businesses to honestly report their 
incomes to tax authorities. To claim tax deductions, end consumers use electronic pay-
ments that are then automatically reported to tax authorities. It is equivalent to busi-
ness buyers reporting their business sellers’ sales to claim their input VAT credit in 
business-to-business transactions. Thus retail businesses whose sales are reported by 
third parties (the consumers) file truthful income tax returns; in fact, they are only 
required to confirm their electronically traceable sales on prefilled tax return forms 
provided by the National Tax Service if they find no errors. This paper shows that by 
incentivizing end consumers to make payments electronically TIETP is effective as a 
tool for reducing underreporting in cash-intensive retail businesses. In Korea, TIETP 
was successful in turning a predominantly cash economy into a largely cashless one, 
with a consequent considerable curtailment of the shadow economy, in a relatively 
short period of time.
Future implications and challenges for countries pursuing an incentive structure to 
induce electronic payment are as follows:
First, critical to TIETP’s success is a legal framework and tax information system 
that enables tax authorities to gain access to and to analyze financial transaction infor-
mation. It would not be possible for TIETP to induce retail businesses’ voluntary com-
pliance if tax authorities were unable to collect and process this information. Korea’s 
2000 Act on the Submission and Management of Taxation Data played a pivotal role 
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in enabling tax authorities to gather electronic financial transaction information and in 
inducing voluntary tax compliance in cash-intensive business sectors. In addition, the 
National Tax Service established an integrated tax system in 1997 to integrate all 
transaction data obtained from electronically traceable payments, including credit 
cards, debit cards, cash receipts in business-to-consumer transactions, e-invoices in 
business-to-business transactions, financial income information, property transaction 
information, and other third-party information provided by public and private institu-
tions. The National Tax Service now makes use of the system to verify taxpayers’ tax 
returns and to analyze risk assessments and tax audits. The National Tax Service also 
uses the system to provide improved taxpayer services by making prefilled tax return 
forms and other tax payment guide services available.
Second, ensuring that the tax rebate process is easy and guarantees the rebate will 
be received are important success factors. The incentives given to end consumers to 
make electronic payments are relatively weak, so if the application process for the tax 
rebate is inconvenient or cumbersome, or if rebate payments are unreliable, people 
will be discouraged from using the system. Korea’s VAT compensation for receipts, 
introduced in 1977, failed because it was inconvenient and the compensation was not 
assured; TIETP, by contrast, has been successful because it is convenient, the result of 
making electronic data processing and application processes part of existing year-end 
tax settlement processes. Wage and salary earners can easily file year-end personal 
income tax settlement returns with prefilled electronically traceable payment informa-
tion provided by the National Tax Service and get TIETP tax refunds along with other 
tax credits due them.
Third, the size of tax incentives should be carefully set so that the revenue that is 
forgone by underwriting TIETP does not exceed the revenue increase gained. One way 
to do this is by setting thresholds and maximum ceilings for TIETP; another is by lim-
iting what counts as eligible TIETPs. Sophisticated tax incentive structures would 
ensure net gain from TIETP.
Fourth, countries wishing to introduce similar tax incentives for electronic pay-
ments should consider their citizens’ financial literacy and their financial sectors’ tech-
nological preparedness. Developing countries pursuing a cashless economy may need 
to make considerable efforts to establish electronic payments among their citizens, 
especially those who regard cash payment as more convenient and secure than elec-
tronic payment (Nwankwo and Eze 2013). If a majority of a country’s people are still 
heavily dependent on cash payments, either due to financial illiteracy, unfamiliarity 
with banking transactions, or lack of IT infrastructure in the financial sectors, TIETP 
should be introduced gradually, in line with the development of other relevant areas. In 
particular, in low-income developing countries where many people do not have access 
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to the financial sector or credit cards, instituting TIETP for credit or check cards might 
be challenging. In this case, electronically traceable cash receipts could be an alterna-
tive, given that it does not require credit cards or bank accounts. Anyone who does not 
have a credit card or access to the financial system can pay with cash and make it elec-
tronically traceable by using a mobile phone number or electronically traceable cash 
receipt card registered to the tax authorities. Technological preparedness in retail sec-
tors and financial sectors is still prerequisite, however.
Fifth, retail vendors’ costs for installing electronic payment terminals and credit 
card payment fees that have to be paid to credit card companies can be a big challenge. 
If retail vendors are reluctant to install credit card payment terminals and accept credit 
cards due to high fees, increasing credit card payment will be difficult. As we have 
noted, the National Tax Service, supported by the 1999 Income Tax Law and VAT 
Law, made strong administrative recommendations encouraging vendors to become 
members of the credit card program. The Korean government strongly supported the 
lowering of credit card fees, which was justified in light of increasing credit card sales 
and the profits of credit card companies.46 In addition, tax credits for credit card sales 
by retail vendors, introduced in 1994, helped to relieve the burden on small retail ven-
dors.
Sixth, tax policy makers should carefully design the tax incentive structure, keep-
ing in mind the distortive effect of overconsumption that credit cards enable, which 
can have a negative impact on the economy. TIETP could spur consumption with the 
expectation of tax cuts (seemingly very marginal but such cuts nevertheless lower the 
cost of the expenditure) and even more with the credit provided by credit cards. 
According to a survey conducted by the Korea Institute of Public Finance (2016, 
p.209), 31.3% of respondents selected the ability to pay without having the cash at 
hand as the first reason they use credit cards; 16.6% selected the convenience of pay-
ment without charges; 13.2% cited various rewards provided by credit card compa-
nies; 12.4 % noted the tax deduction; 10.7% appreciated the possibility of installment 
payments; 10.1% opted for credit cards because of the possibility of paying without 
having a balance in the account. Tax incentives for making payments using debit cards 
or electronically traceable cash receipts may thus have fewer distortive effects on con-
sumption and saving choices but relatively bigger substitution effects between non-
traceable and traceable payments. Korea experienced the negative effect of overcon-
sumption in the early stages of TIETP. Credit card transactions in Korea skyrocketed 
46. “Lowering Credit Card Fees by 1–2%,” Mail Economy, September 11, 1999; “Government 
Calls for Lowering Credit Card Fees,” Mail Economy, December 18, 1999; “Credit Card 
Fees, Maximum 10% Lowered Within This Year,” Dong-a Ilbo, December 17, 1999.
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between 1999 and 2002 after the introduction of TIETP, as shown in figure 3. While 
such a drastic increase in credit card transactions contributed to broadening the tax 
base to a great extent, overconsumption based on credit facilitated by credit cards put 
the Korean economy under tremendous stress. It is believed that TIETP coupled with 
deregulation of the credit card business, credit companies’ reckless issuance of credit 
cards, and lax credit controls caused widespread credit-card-debt defaults and led to 
the collapse of at least one credit card company during 2002–2003. In response to this 
negative effect of TIETP, the Korean government in 2003 increased the deduction rate 
of TIETP for debit card transactions from 20% to 30% to induce consumers to use 
debit cards instead, while maintaining the deduction rate for credit card transactions. 
In addition, electronically traceable cash receipts were introduced in 2005. These mea-
sures shifted a substantial portion of credit card transactions to debit cards or electroni-
cally traceable cash receipt transactions.
Seventh, given that tax deductions unevenly benefit higher income deciles over 
others, under the progressive personal income tax structure, tax credits as a form of 
TIETP are worth reviewing as a policy alternative. As mentioned, although Korea’s 
TIETP has net positive effects on the GINI coefficient due to the tax-broadening 
effect, tax deductions have also had regressive effects of tax deductions.
Lastly, it should be admitted that TIETP broadens the tax base by taking advantage 
of tax incentives. TIETP provides a tax relief, which, like other tax incentives, has a 
lock-in effect. Many discussions conclude that TIETP should be repealed because it 
has not broadened the business income tax base enough; nonetheless, TIETP remains 
in place in Korea because wage and salary earners have a vested interest in it. Further-
more, it is not clear if business income would continue to be reported honestly if 
TIETP were withdrawn. Given these questions, further research may be needed to sup-
port a definitive conclusion that TIETP has actually enhanced voluntary compliance 
and changed taxpayers’ behavior for good.
One of the most important findings is the estimation of revenue and distributional 
effects based on counterfactual analyses and simulations. However, we have not con-
sidered behavioral changes in taxpayers, although that does not seem to be noticeably 
large. But our not having explored this aspect may be a shortcoming and so it would 
be desirable to introduce a utility maximization model to address it.
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Appendix 1. Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
The Household Income and Expenditure Survey is collected, compiled, and 
released by Statistics Korea. Thousands of households are included in each layer of 
cross-sectional sample, up to roughly 10,000. Every household is repeatedly sur-
veyed for three to five years on a monthly basis, and results are compiled and 
released on a quarterly basis. Households are identifiable by unique identification 
numbers preassigned by Statistics Korea, allowing monthly or quarterly information 
to be easily convertible into annual values household by household. Households in 
the sample are replaced with new households on a regular basis after three to five 
years of participation. However, any number of households typically will be 
replaced sooner, particularly when they become unable to be surveyed for any rea-
son, such as movement abroad or movement without notice, abrupt refusal to partic-
ipate, demise, divorce, and so on.
Descriptive statistics for the 2014 Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
are reported in the following table.
Table A-1 Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2014 Descriptive Statistics                
                 (Unit: thousand ₩)
Average Standard Dev. Maximum Minimum
Age of Household Head 52.34 14.03 95 17
Household Size (Number of 
Family Members) 2.75 1.26 8 1
Number of Income Earners 1.25 0.88 6 0
Market Income 43,305 31,490 300,868 0
Gross Income 48,088 30,254 300,354 0
Disposable Income 43,858 25,996 289,418 0
Consumption Expenditure 26,534 16,896 213,639 925
Personal Income Tax for 
Wage/Salary and Business 
Income
1,775 3,358 55,607 0
Property Tax Burden 204 391 5,686 0
Social Security Contributions 2,432 2,411 43,561 0
Private Transfer Income 2,421 8,025 104,824 0
Public Transfer Income 2,362 6,312 86,653 0
Note: The 2014 Household Income and Expenditure Survey catalogues information from 4,904 households. It 
is annualized from quarterly variables.
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Appendix 2. Methodology of Personal Income Tax Estimation
Personal income tax burdens were estimated using the annualized Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey data set and the Korean national tax simulator pro-
gram developed by the Korea Institute of Public Finance, a tax liability calculator 
similar to TAXSIM, used by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Personal income tax burdens were estimated separately for wage and salary 
income earners and for self-employed business income earners. We calculated the 
personal income tax burdens of wage and salary income earners directly with the tax 
simulator program, using the raw income data in Household Income and Expendi-
ture Survey, under the assumption that wage and salary income earners reported 
their true income honestly in the survey. However, given the tendency of the 
self-employed to underreport their income even in anonymous surveys, we drew on 
Sung’s (1999) methodology to modify income data reported in the Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey by the self-employed for personal income tax cal-
culations. Further, we assumed that all business income earners were risk neutral 
and, as a result, that their tax compliance rates were all the same. First, the real busi-
ness income of each household was estimated by comparing income-consumption 
patterns between wage and salary earners and the self-employed, as is done by Pis-
sarides and Weber (1989). Second, the business income reporting ratio (β) in the fol-
lowing formula was estimated through the iterative method.
Where β is the ratio (1<β<1) of business income reported to the National Tax 
Service to real business income (which is estimated in the first step); PIT(β×RBI) is 
personal income tax burden of reported business income (β×RBI) of each household 
calculated by the tax simulator program; PITrev is the total personal income tax rev-
enue from business income given in the Statistical Yearbook of National Tax 
(National Tax Service 2015); and N is the total number of personal income tax tax-
payers of business income given in the Statistical Yearbook of National Tax (Nation-
al Tax Service 2015). Lastly, the personal income tax burdens of business income 
per household in each decile were estimated with the tax simulator program using 
the real business income, business income reporting ratio (β), and demographic data 




 ∑PIT(β × RBI)
(β × ∑RBI)
